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BOOK REVIEWS

Joanna Wharton, Material Enlightenment: Women Writers and the
Science of Mind, 1770–1830. Suffolk: Boydell Press, 2018. xii1276 pp.
US$99.00.
Joanna Wharton’s Material Enlightenment: Women Writers and the Science
of Mind, 1770–1830 is a recent addition to the interdisciplinary series Studies
in the Eighteenth Century that Boydell Press (Boydell & Brewer Publishers)
is publishing in association with the British Society for Eighteenth Century
Studies. It is a welcome addition to the growing body of work that addresses
the contributions of late eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century British
women writers to areas of scientiﬁc, philosophical, and otherwise “learned”
discourse that have historically been associated primarily—and in many
cases exclusively—with male thinkers and writers. Wharton’s study therefore helps to ﬂesh out the picture of women’s intellectual, imaginative, and
cultural contributions to their times and their sociopolitical milieus that
has been traced in greater detail in the areas of literature and the arts, as
well as in political, social, and economic activism. Less widely remarked—
and even less well examined—have been the remarkable achievements of
British women like Caroline Herschel (astronomy), Etheldred Benett (often called the ﬁrst female geologist), Harriet Henrietta Beaufort (botany),
Elizabeth Fulhame (chemistry), Mary Somerville (physics), Lady Hester
Stanhope (archaeology), and Maria Graham (travel writing). Women
and the science of mind, Wharton’s particular focus, has received even less
notice, notwithstanding Alan Richardson’s work (most notably his British
Romanticism and the Science of Mind, 2001) and that of others (such as
The Wordsworth Circle (Fall 2019) © 2019 The University of Chicago. All rights reserved.
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Jennie Batchelor, 2010; Sara Ahmed, 2010; and Richard Sha, 2018) who
have followed.
Central to Wharton’s discussion are the vexed circumstances of unconventional thinkers (of both sexes) like Dissenters, as Anna Letitia Aikin
(Barbauld), her brother John Aikin, and her niece Lucy Aiken were, when
it came to participation in the sort of philosophical debates that are at the
center of Material Enlightenment. Locke’s challenge to the conventional
notion of innate ideas in the form of his counterparadigm of the tabula
rasa asserted that human identity was the product of individual circumstances, a contention that essentially signaled the transition in eighteenthcentury thinking away from character considered as a reﬂection of generalized and primarily shared matter(s) and toward a view that was grounded
instead in what William Blake called “Minute Particulars.” More importantly for women, “Locke’s Essay [Concerning Human Understanding,
1689] fundamentally altered the terms of early feminist philosophy,” elbowing out the old Cartesian dualist model of mind in favor of an alternative model grounded in the bodily senses that anticipated “the feminist
potential of sense-based psychology” (9–10). Joanne Wharton proposes
that despite their exclusion from the educational opportunities afforded
their male contemporaries (including the medical profession), women nevertheless “engaged closely and enthusiastically with the ‘science of man’”
while risking much by engaging in the “precarious” activities of “speculation and disputation on the nature of mind” (7). Wharton cites Harriet
Guest’s perceptive observation that women writers’ recourse to the language and discourse of sensibility in the context of the outbreak of war
with revolutionary France at once signaled their exclusion from partisan
political discourse and empowered them with the unbounded discourse
of human feeling (Unbounded Attachment: The Culture of Sensibility:
Sex and Society in Eighteenth-Century Britain, 1992). As Wharton sees
it, this rhetorical model enabled women to reimagine human society
and women’s place within it: not somewhere near the periphery but, instead, right at the center. However, although critical attention during
the past two centuries has usually focused on the most radical feminists
(Wollstonecraft, Hays, etc.), Wharton argues that the most culturally inﬂuential discussion among early proponents of women’s potential as
“thinkers” (and therefore social theorists) came instead from more predictably conservative, conventional women writers. Moreover, the notorious sexist attacks of male harpies such as Richard Polwhele (The Unsex’d
Females, 1798) not only failed, ultimately, to repudiate and silence women
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philosophers, but in reality served to identify and then reinforce a far more
diverse and pliant afﬁliation than what Polwhele and his male colleagues
thought they saw. This diversity of thought and community—and the extent to which the women involved recognized it, appreciated it, and cultivated it—is the real sociocultural achievement that Wharton sets out to
delineate for us, demonstrating how and why we may proﬁtably place in
revealing intellectual “conversation” writers such as Barbauld, Honora
and Maria Edgeworth, Hannah More, and Elizabeth Hamilton, in contradistinction to the more familiar constellation of Wollstonecraft, Hays,
Helen Maria Williams, and other early radical feminists. The more complicated and highly nuanced assessment of the dynamics of Romantic-era
women’s involvement with the psychology of mind that Wharton begins
to outline here draws on the work of scholars such as the late Mitzi Myers
(on children’s literature), Kathryn Sutherland (on More), Batchelor (on
conduct literature), and Emma Major (on women and religion) in illustrating the often surprisingly intense involvement of the less radical feminist psychologists with one another’s insights and imperatives. That mediated dynamic at the same time both fostered and illustrated a sense of
interpersonal relations based not upon the more familiar and aggressively
competitive masculinist model but rather upon a companionate model of
community effort and shared discourse, a model whose troubling echoes
of the egalitarian revolution across the Channel were of course quite evident among the alarmed male establishment.
Wharton’s argument proceeds from her conviction that the signal contributions to the history of philosophy made by Romantic-era women are
grounded in the physical, material aspects of human experience—in this
case in the materiality of texts, according to which interpretation these authors “understood literature as psychology in motion” (27). Wharton’s systematic examination of the work of ﬁve women writers assesses the emerging late Enlightenment opinion that physical, material objects—written
texts in particular—possess a degree of agency through whose effects they
may shape physical actions and both deﬁne and regulate social associations
and behaviors. In the process, she contends, these writers drew ever nearer
an understanding of physical matter as fundamentally active, not static, and
therefore endued with social, religious, and political signiﬁcance (29).
Wharton’s case studies are Anna Letitia Barbauld (particularly her Lessons for Children, 1778–79, and Hymns in Prose for Children, 1781), Honara
Edgeworth (Practical Education, 1798), Hannah More (Strictures on . . . Female Education, 1799, and Coelebs in Search of a Wife, 1808–9), Elizabeth
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Hamilton (especially Letters on the Elementary Principles of Education,
1801), and Maria Edgeworth (especially Practical Education, 1798, with
Richard Lovell Edgeworth; and The Parent’s Assistant, 1800). Wharton
cites Barbauld’s Providentialism as a lifelong intellectual touchstone, tracing it through both that proliﬁc author’s Dissenting intellectual, cultural,
and religious milieu and her voluminous literary production. Barbauld’s
characteristic emphasis on cultivating a “devotional” attitude both to the
natural world and to human productions informs both her educational program and her often contestatory sociopolitical stance as represented in
works as seemingly different as her prose Sins of Government (1793) and
her controversial poem Eighteen Hundred and Eleven (1812). Both of these
works, however, Wharton observes, are rooted in the principles she articulated in those early works for children: “greatness” (by which she means
moral superiority) is to be achieved not by means of “remedial” education, however well intentioned, but rather by that providential intervention through which individuals and societies learn through “mortiﬁcation” to reject pride, luxury, and cultural domination and to embrace
instead the salutary humility and moral steadfastness that result from
an informed, nurtured sensitivity to the lessons taught by the physical,
material world and its maker.
Wharton turns next to Honora (Sneyd) Edgeworth and her 1798 Practical Education, written in collaboration with her father Richard Lovell
Edgeworth. Like Barbauld—both in intellectual inclination and in applied
pedagogy—Honora Edgeworth adopts the Lockean principle of linking
education with pleasure, seasoning didacticism with delight. What particularly distinguishes her, though, is her ﬁrm grounding in the efﬁcacy of
the “experimental science” of education in which her work played and
important early role (74). A ﬁrm adherent of a disciplinarian approach
to education (children must be “managed,” “respectful,” “obedient”), she
was clearly no follower of Rousseau’s more indulgent paradigm, as Wharton explains. And yet she was fundamentally “anti-despotic” both in theory
and in practice. Indeed, a particularly fascinating aspect of this chapter
is Wharton’s discussion of how Edgeworth’s notebook accounts of her
educational theories relate to their application in actual practices. Wharton
considers the notebooks both “as emotional objects and as knowledge objects,” as “repositories of the psychological and physical growth” of her children, and then, later, as “artefacts of exemplary motherhood” (78–79).
While not strictly despotic, it emerges, her pedagogy is nevertheless ﬁrm

book reviews

439

in its reliance upon obedience and respect as “a necessary pre-condition
of the educative process” (95), a fundamentally paternalistic process that
she nevertheless envisions as benevolent and progressive.
In Hannah More we meet the energetic moralist eager to enlist Enlightenment philosophy in service to unswervingly conservative social and
political ends. Wharton ﬁrst traces how More began early on to apply to
material and textual productions the associationism she learned from
Locke. Then she turns to the “later” (1799 and after), when More adapted
associationist techniques speciﬁcally to realign Enlightenment thought
with—and in service to—evangelical Christian morality. In her Strictures
(1799) More famously associated Mary Wollstonecraft with the “corrupting” inﬂuence of European thought and literature and its advocacy of female self-expression and self-empowerment. Hence in Coelebs (1808–9)
she redeﬁnes the domestic space as a site for female self-sacriﬁce as part
of a larger intellectual and sociopolitical project to “transform the hero
of [conventional sentimental] romance into a Christian ideal” (118). In
the “Mendip” schools that Hannah and Martha More founded, Wharton
explains, “mechanistic physical employment” was enlisted to reinforce class
barriers by not-so-subtly subverting popular democratizing efforts to expand literacy. Although favoring a strictly circumscribed curriculum combined with authoritarian pedagogy (children’s “wicked ways” must be severely corrected), More nevertheless appreciated that the carrot was more
effective than the stick and so adopted a sensory approach to education
that was not unlike Barbauld’s (More was in fact an admirer). It is not surprising, then, Wharton suggests, that More’s Cheap Repository Tracts employ many of the same pedagogical strategies found in her schools and
their materials, marshaled in this case to reeducate laboring-class adults
into compliant loyalist citizens. By the time she reaches Coelebs, More has
turned her focus still more directly to women, transferring to them the
materialist pedagogy she had previously directed toward children and
then toward (primarily male) laborers, redirecting the model of “Christian economy” visible in the Strictures and the tracts (149). In all of these
efforts, Wharton points out, More’s consummate skill as thinker, writer,
rhetorician, and conservative ideologue ensured her extraordinary success
in the literary market, however dimly we may regard her ideas today. She
wrote with equal facility in the idiom of rich and poor, disenfranchised
and privileged, and—as many of her contemporaries recorded—she was
universally read. Her investment in a distinctly materialist Enlightenment
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philosophy (and its sociopolitical potential) reﬂects the extent to which she
hoped to harness that tradition (and its force) in service to loyalist, nationalist purposes.
Elizabeth Hamilton’s Elementary Principles of Education (1802) Wharton situates solidly within the associationist tradition, too, regarding it as
a somewhat differently inﬂected but nevertheless thoroughly Christian
moral treatise despite Hamilton’s intellectually “ecumenical” practice of
drawing freely from the works of friend and foe alike when it comes to pursuing “truth.” Interestingly, Hamilton cites her own limited education as
an advantage: deprived of extensive formal education, she has learned
from material experience, uninhibited by artiﬁcially imposed proscription.
Like More and Barbauld, Hamilton yokes Lockeanism and Christianity to
a single cart, regarding religion and psychology as “mutually illuminative”
(164), recognizing that (moral) education begins with those experiential
“building blocks” acquired starting in childhood where the majority of
their teachers are women. In the process she observes that this especially
formative function of women within education suggests one of the primary gender-based reasons why women’s foundational role within the
philosophical tradition in general has historically been insufﬁciently credited. Employing a variety of literary vehicles, including satire, Hamilton
constructs a practical argument grounded in associationist psychology
and built upon “experientially tested materials from sources both close
to and far from home” (167). Much as poets like Wordsworth and Robinson drew their imaginative ore from mines of the ordinary quotidian
world, so too did materialist philosophers such as Hamilton draw upon
those same universally familiar and accessible material sources for their
own democratizing exercises in philosophy and pedagogy. Near the end
of her chapter, Wharton insightfully reminds us not to misread Hamilton’s
domestic ideology as an inherently conservative one unattuned to feminism, for “her writings proffer innovative, covert feminist strategies for
power” in their appeal to union and impartiality. She “conceptualizes the
science of mind as a comprehensive female philosophy; a domestic adaptation of embodied psychology that combines the religious, social and experimental” (194).
Finally, Maria Edgeworth is discussed, about whom more critical analysis has almost certainly been written than about the others whom Wharton considers here, and whose home Wharton describes as “a space that was
populated by knowledge objects” (197). Again, that emphasis on the formative value of object, of material things, underpins the author’s thoughtful
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analysis of Edgeworth’s various books as “psychotechnologies of Enlightenment” (200). From The Parent’s Assistant (1796) through her late novel
Helen (1834), Wharton contends, Edgeworth’s attention is seldom far from
metaphysics and the science of mind, nor is there for her any functional
distance at all between art and science, which are inextricably linked in
the worldview that Maria Edgeworth derived from and shared with her
father. As Wharton neatly and succinctly writes at this chapter’s end, Edgeworth’s novels are “repositories of inventions” whose “intertextual mechanisms animate the text,” requiring of their consumers an explicitly “industrious” variety of reading. Yet while her writing seems both to demand
and to direct materialist readings, those writings nevertheless “speak to the
vital necessity of the literary imagination to material Enlightenment” (230).
In sum, then, it is worth noting that Wharton acknowledges—and appropriately stresses—what too few cultural critics of the Romantic era have
acknowledged: that some of the most popular, inﬂuential, and persuasive
writers of the period were women whose stand on “gender politics” was
decidedly conservative and even downright reactionary. Like so much of
cultural criticism, that which addresses Romanticism typically embraces
the new, the progressive, the contestatory, the rebellious while repudiating
the staid, the conventional, the conservative, the mortally didactic. And
yet, to do so in this binary fashion is to misread and oversimplify the rich
rhetorical, intellectual, sociopolitical, and cultural dynamism of this remarkable era. Just as Romanticism studies have begun to expand the ﬁeld’s
parameters to include the physical sciences, technology, and industry, is
fresh attention being paid to parallel advances in psychology, physiology,
and medicine, and in the process ﬁnally beginning adequately to trace and
credit the remarkable contributions to all these areas also of women. As
we reformulate our understanding of what Romanticism both was and
is, Wharton’s Material Enlightenment contributes meaningfully to this
important project of recovery and reassessment.
Stephen Behrendt, University of Nebraska
doi: 10.1086/707200

